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Local Content and the Marginal Fields Programme: Challenges 
for Indigenous Participation in the Nigerian Oil Industry 
 
Elimma C. Ezeani ⃰ and Chinwe Nwuke ⃰ ⃰⃰ ⃰ 
 
Abstract 
 
The upstream oil sector in Nigeria since the discovery of oil in the 1950s has been dominated 
by international oil companies. To revise this situation and learning from the experience of 
countries with strong representation for indigenous local participation such as Norway and 
Brazil, Nigeria adopted the Marginal Fields Programme (MFP) allocating marginal oil and 
gas fields to Nigerian enterprises. This agenda was further boosted by local content 
provisions in a Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act 2010 (the Local 
Content Act). The main aim of this joint action is to advance local participation in the oil 
industry, further liberalise the oil sector and create greater opportunities for jobs and 
entrepreneurship by Nigerians. This paper considers the potential of the MFP and the 2010 
Act on achieving these objectives.  
1. Introduction 
Nigeria, the first country in Sub-Saharan Africa to export crude oil1, still possesses huge 
resources of oil and gas with an approximate oil production of 2 million barrels per day 
(Bpd).2 Oil is the country’s main source of revenue and it can be argued that the country’s 
budgets, policies and development plans over the years since the first discovery of crude in 
Oloibiri have hinged on the profits from the oil sector.  
 
The principal legislation for the Nigerian oil and gas industry is the Petroleum Act of 1969. 
This Act vests the ownership and control of all petroleum in the State.3  Three main 
objectives drive the present initiative to open up the Nigerian upstream oil sector to more 
private-sector participation. According to Hilary Nwokonko these are: Maximisation of oil 
exploration benefits; Provision of incentives to encourage foreign investment and; Promotion 
of indigenous participation in the upstream sector of the industry.4 This paper is primarily 
concerned with the first and third of these objectives i.e. the maximisation of oil exploration 
benefits and promotion of indigenous participation. 
 
Two policies adopted towards these ends are the (i) Marginal Fields Programme; and (ii) the 
local content legal framework. The grant of marginal fields’ licenses and allocation of 
                                       
⃰ Elimma C. Ezeani LLB, BL, LLM, PhD. Fellow HEA. Lecturer in Law, Robert Gordon University Aberdeen 
e.ezeani@rgu.ac.uk   (Corresponding author). The authors are grateful to the editors for their comments and to 
Chisa Onyejekwe (Doctoral Candidate, Law School, RGU) for her research assistance.  
⃰⃰ ⃰ Chinwe Nwuke LLB, BL, LLM chinwecn@outlook.com 
 
 
1 CEE Bankwatch et al, “The Reality behind EU “Energy Security”: the case of Nigeria” September 2011, page 
14. 
2 Per Heum and others, ‘Enhancement of Local Content in the Upstream Oil and Gas Industry in Nigeria – A 
Comprehensive and Viable Policy Approach’ SNF Report No. 25/03 (2003) 1; 9. Also referred to in this paper 
as “the INTSOK Report”.   
3 The Petroleum Act 1969, s 1. 
4 See Chiagozie Hilary-Nwokonko, ‘Enhancing Local Content in the Upstream Oil and Gas Industry in Nigeria: 
An Appraisal of Current Policy’ (2004) Vol. 2 Issue 1 Oil, Gas & Energy Law Intelligence  
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marginal oil fields through farm–out agreements is an essential   mechanism by which 
interests are assigned to marginal field operators, and incentivising local participation by 
private indigenous companies. In a broad sense, Marginal oil fields, are those oil fields that 
had been abandoned or left undeveloped for a long period due to their non-commercial 
volume of oil production.5  These fields are reclaimed by the Federal Government with the 
aim of reallocating these fields to indigenous companies willing and able (technically and 
financially) to develop them.6 However, the Petroleum Act defines such fields as being such 
field as the President may, from time to time, identify as a marginal field.7 The reallocation is 
undertaken through a platform known as the ‘Marginal Fields Program’ (MFP). A further 
legislation supplementing this move towards greater indigenous participation has also been 
enacted - the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act of 2010 (hereinafter 
referred to as the ‘Local Content Act’).8   
 
Prior to the Local Content Act, actual operations and technical activities in the upstream oil 
and gas sector in Nigeria have mostly been carried out by foreign firms and contractors with 
limited participation from Nigerian firms (apart from NNPC which holds majority 
participating interests in JV/JOAs) which is as a result of a perceived lack of technical and 
expert labour and financial resources.9   The impact has been negligible employment figures 
by the sector of Nigerians and a commensurate lack in the capacity of local entrepreneurs to 
contribute to the wider financial and social benefits from an oil dependent economy.10 Efforts 
specifically targeted towards enhancing local content in the oil and gas sector began in the 
late 1990s, with the setting of a local content achievement target of 30 per cent to be attained 
by 2005 and 60 per cent by 2010.11 These targets were considered ambitious because as at the 
time they were set, the realized local content level was estimated at 5%. However, by 2008 
the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), working with major oil companies 
and other local stakeholders successfully raised local content in Nigeria from single-digit 
levels to about 30 per cent.  Regrettably, the country was unable to meet the targets set for 
2005 and 2010 respectively. 
 
Government directives asking companies to conduct all design and front-end engineering 
work for upstream projects in the country as well as the sourcing for seismic data processing 
projects12 also meant that local content input had to be actualised. To this end, Chevron 
Nigeria Limited and the NNPC established a Local Business Development Unit, which was 
responsible for activities relating to the award of contracts to local oil firms, and facilitation 
                                       
5 Lawrence Atsegbua, ‘Issues in the Development of Marginal Oilfields in Nigeria’ (2005) Vol. 23 Issue 3 
Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law p 323. 
6 Ibid.  
7 Paragraph 17, First Schedule Petroleum Act 2004. The schedule together with the Nigerian Oil and Gas 
Industry Content Development Act sets out the legal framework for the allocation of marginal oil fields.  
8 Likewise, the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB), which is awaiting passage into law, proposes more changes 
regarding indigenous participation in the oil and gas industry. Some benefits to the country include: 
Opportunities for more indigenous participation; Prospects for local employment; Acquisition of technical 
experience by operators located in Nigeria; Increase in the involvement of local banks with regards to funding.  
9 Oruwari Humphrey Otombosoba and Adewale Dosunmu, ‘Local Content Policy and Its Implications on 
Marginal Oil Fields Operations and the Nigerian Economy’ (2016) 5(6) International Journal of Research and 
Development 354: 357.  
10 H U Nwosu and others, ‘Local Involvement in Harnessing Crude Oil and Natural Gas in Nigeria’ (2006) Vol. 
83 Issue 11 Applied Energy p. 1278. 
11 Per Heum (n 2), 25. 
12 Ulrich Klueh and others, ‘Policies to Improve the Local Impact from Hydrocarbon Extraction: Observations 
on West Africa and Possible Lessons Learnt for Central Asia’ (2009) Vol. 37 Issue 3 Energy Policy pp 1128-
1144.  
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of technology transfer.13  Another initiative was the establishment of the Onne Oil and Gas 
Free Zone in 1997, which provided employment opportunities for the local residents.14 The 
creation of the free zone was to help strengthen Nigeria’s position as Sub-Sahara Africa’s 
leading oil producer and more than thirty national and international companies are currently 
registered as free zone users15  
 
In this paper we examine the interaction between the efforts to optimise production by the 
reallocation of marginal fields, the parallel attempt to boost indigenous participation by the 
enactment of the Local Content Act, and the extent to which regulatory activities establish a 
dependable framework for the future of resource optimisation Nigeria. Section 2 is an 
overview of the local content framework in Nigeria’s oil and gas industry and the relevant 
regulations in the oil sector. Section 3 reviews the efforts towards enhancing indigenous 
participation under the Local Content Act. In Section 4, the Marginal Oil Fields Programme 
is examined while in section 5 the paper considers the challenges to the objectives of 
enhancing local participation in the oil industry and ensuring resource optimisation. The 
paper makes its conclusion in section 6.   
2. Local Content and Oil Sector Regulations 
Local Content has been referred to as a set of policies that increase the utilisation of national 
human and material resources and domiciles economic activity, previously located abroad, in 
the country.16 A report from the United Nations describes local content as the purchase or use 
by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any domestic source.17 Other views 
hold that ‘Local content’ is a means of enhancing national wealth through economic 
development and additional employment of locals;18 in the oil and gas industry, it includes 
‘developing local economies, stimulating industrial development, increasing local capability, 
building a skilled workforce and creating a competitive supplier base’.19  
 
In the INTSOK Report, a study on the enhancement of local content in the Nigerian oil and 
gas industry produced by the combined effort of the Norwegian and Nigerian government 
agencies, local content is defined in relation to jobs or value added or created anywhere in the 
domestic economy, as a result of the actions of an oil and gas company.20 Local content could 
also refer to the provision of infrastructure for the benefit of the local population. In this 
sense, it is essentially the development of local skills, technology transfer and use of local 
                                       
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. See further Oil and Gas Free Zone Onne, www.onnefreezone.com/ accessed 19 May 2016. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Jesse Ovadia, ‘Measurement and Implementation of Local Content In Nigeria – A Framework for Working 
With Stakeholders to Increase the Effectiveness of Local Content Monitoring and Development’ (Facility for 
Oil Sector Transparency in Nigeria, January 2013) http://cpparesearch.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/12/FOSTER-Measurement-and-Implementation-of-Local-Content.pdf  accessed 19 May 
2016. 
17 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2007: Transnational 
Corporations, Extractive Industries and Development (United Nations Publication 2007) ch 5, 129. 
18 Willy Olsen, ‘Local Content Development: What Will It Take?’ (United Nations Development Program 
Conference, Cambodia, March 2008) 11 www.un.org.kh/undp/media/files/undpconf_present080327_olsen1.pdf  
accessed 8 July 2014 
19 Accenture: ‘Developing Local Content Programs: Insights from Accenture for global players to 
achieve high performance in today’s competitive energy landscape: (page 2) at: 
http://www.criticaleye.com/insights-servfile.cfm?id=833  accessed 19 May 2016. 
20 The INTSOK Report (n 2);  see also  Hilary-Nwokonko (n 4).  
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manpower and local manufacturing, thereby creating skilled workforce and competitive 
supplier base.21  
 
Petroleum operations in Nigeria were previously regulated by the Mineral Oils Act of 1958. 
The Mineral Oils Act was repealed and replaced by Decree No. 51 of 1969, which is now 
known as the Petroleum Act of 1969. Other relevant regulation includes the Petroleum 
(Drilling and Production) Regulations 1969, and the proposed Petroleum Industry Bill. A 
brief examination of these regulations and the departments that oversee their operations is 
undertaken below:  
2.1 Petroleum Act of 1969 
At present, this is the overriding legislation for activities and operations in the Nigerian oil 
and gas industry.  It contains four schedules, which seek to modernise the previous licensing 
regime without affecting its perception and ideologies. Section 1 of the Act vests entire 
ownership and control of petroleum in the State. By virtue of sections 2 and 8(a) respectively, 
the Minister may grant licenses or leases, and supervise all operations carried out under these.  
The Act further provides that half of the awarded area shall be relinquished ten years after the 
grant of an oil mining lease (OML).22 It also prohibits the importation, storage, sale or 
distribution of any petroleum products in Nigeria without a license granted by the Minister.23 
The Minister may also make regulations providing generally for matters relating to licenses 
and leases granted under this Act and operations thereunder.24 
 
The Act places restrictions on assignments of leases or licenses.25 The Minister shall consent 
to an assignment if, among others, he is satisfied that the proposed assignee has sufficient 
technical knowledge, experience and financial resources to effectively carry out the required 
petroleum activities.26 In accordance with the local content policy, the Act provides for state 
participation27 and the employment of national personnel.28 The Act also contains specific 
local content provisions. It provides that within 10 years of grant of OML, 75 per cent total of 
Nigerian citizens should be in managerial, professional and supervisory ranks.29 The OML 
holder must also ensure that all skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers are citizens of 
Nigeria. A detailed program for the recruitment and training of Nigerian must also be 
submitted by the holder of an oil prospecting license (OPL) or OML for the approval of the 
Minister.30  
 
                                       
21 Joe Asamoah, 'Local Content in the Oil and Gas Industry' (Oil and Gas IQ, 2014) 
http://www.oilandgasiq.com/strategy-management-and-information/articles/local-content-in-the-oil-and-gas-
industry  accessed 19 May 2016.  
22 The Petroleum Act 1969, s 13. The OML is an exclusive right to search for, win, work, carry away and 
dispose of petroleum. 
23 Ibid, s 4 
24 Ibid, s 9(b) 
25 Ibid, first schedule, para 14. The Act states that the holder of an OPL or OML shall not assign his lease, 
license or interest without prior consent of the Minister. 
26 Ibid, para 16(ii). Some indigenous E & P companies have acquired majority participating interests previously 
held by IOCs. See generally Tade Oyewunmi; "Natural Gas Exploration and Production in Nigeria and 
Mozambique: Legal and Contractual Issues" [part of OGEL Special on "Natural Gas Developments: An 
International and Challenging Legal Framework”] OGEL 1 (2015), particularly at pp 5 – 9.  
27 Ibid, para 34. 
28 Ibid, para 37. 
29 The Petroleum Act 1969, First Schedule, para 38. 
30 The Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations, Reg 26. 
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2.2 Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations of 1969 
The Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations (the “D&P Regulations”) is made 
pursuant to the Petroleum Act of 1969. The Regulations oblige lessees and licensees to 
recruit and train Nigerians.31 Similar to the Nigeria Oil and Gas Industry Content 
Development Act of 2010, Regulation 26 of the D&P Regulations mandates licensees and 
lessees to submit a detailed program for the recruitment and training of Nigerians within 
twelve months of the grant of the license, for the Minister’s approval. The Petroleum Act of 
1969 empowers the Minister to make and issue new regulations or amend existing ones in 
respect of petroleum operations carried out under leases or license granted under the Act. 
Accordingly, these regulations are amended from time to time to introduce or change 
significant issues such as royalty rates or utilisation of associated gas.32 
2.3 Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) 
The Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) is a product of the recommendations of a Presidential 
Committee set up to undertake reforms in the Nigerian oil and gas industry in 2007.33 It was 
initially introduced in December 2008 but has undergone numerous revisions. A new version 
was presented to the National Assembly on 18 July 2012 by the immediate past federal 
government administration (PIB 2012) following the recommendations of its PIB Task 
Force.34 
 
By and large, the PIB encourages the development of Nigerian content in the petroleum 
industry by providing for the award of licenses or leases to any indigenous oil company.35 
The PIB provides a definition of an indigenous oil company that is synonymous with that 
given by the Local Content Act.36 The PIB is intended to repeal previous oil and gas 
legislations upon commencement.  
2.4 Ministry of Petroleum Resources (MPR) 
The Ministry of Petroleum Resources has the main supervisory responsibility over Nigeria’s 
oil resources. It formulates policies for the oil and gas industry and coordinates the 
implementation of approved policies. Its main objective is to create an internationally 
                                       
31 The Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations 1969, reg 26(1).  
32 Bernard Taverne, Petroleum, Industry and Governments: An Introduction to Petroleum Regulation, Economics 
and Government Policies (Kluwer Law International Ltd, 1999) 198.  
The Regulations were amended in 1988, 2001 and 2006. See further DPR - Acts and Regulations available at 
https://dpr.gov.ng/index/acts-and-regulations/  accessed 19 May 2016. See < 
www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/oscola_4th_edn_hart_2012.pdf > 
33 The quest towards having a PIB began as far back as 2000 with the inauguration of the Oil and Gas Sector 
Reform Implementation Committee (“OGIC”) by the Nigerian Presidency to carry out a comprehensive reform 
of the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry. As a result of the OGIC’s recommendations the National Oil and Gas 
Policy 2004 was approved and the OGIC was re-ccommissioned in 2007 by the Presidency to draft a Bill based 
on the National Oil and Gas Policy 2004. The PIB was thereafter submitted to the National Assembly in 2008. 
34 Presently, the PIB has been segmented into three bills (possibly governance, taxation and business items) 
based on feedback from stakeholders and it is expected that the Nigerian Senate will begin the hearing of the bill 
shortly. 
35 See Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC)‘An Overview of the Petroleum Industry Bill’ available 
at www.nnpcgroup.com/portals/0/pdf/pibconsultativeforum.pdf accessed 19 May 2016.   
36 Section 106 of the 2010 Act provides for at least 51 per cent ownership by Nigerians. Additionally, the PIB 
would ensure that the holder of an OML employs a minimum of 95 per cent Nigerians in management and 
supervisory roles. 
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competitive oil and gas sector, which contributes excellently to the development of the 
Nigerian economy. The Ministry exercises its regulatory function through the Department of 
Petroleum Resources (DPR).   
2.5 Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) 
The Department regulates and monitors all activities of the oil and gas industry.37 It is 
responsible for the daily monitoring of the petroleum industry and for overseeing all 
petroleum industry operations carried out under licences and leases in accordance with 
industry practices.38 The tasks set out for the DPR include to: Regulate oil and gas 
operations; Administer oil and gas acreages and concessions and; Implement government 
policies on upstream oil and gas issues. 39 In addition, the Department ensures compliance 
with applicable laws and regulations in line with good practice. The DPR is also authorised to 
monitor the Nigerian government’s indigenisation policy to ensure that the local content 
ideology is attainable. In furtherance of this, the Guidelines for Farm-out and Operations of 
Marginal Fields were issued by the DPR so as to ease the procedure for farmout and 
operation of marginal fields. A map of the available marginal fields is published on the DPR 
web pages.40  
 
The Guidelines for Farm-out and Operation of Marginal Fields ( “Guidelines”) were initially 
issued in July 2001 for the first bid round and replaced in November 2013 by new guidelines 
for the proposed (didn’t hold) second bid round. Under the Guidelines, eligibility to bid for a 
marginal field notes that “[T]he indigenous company shall be substantially Nigerian and shall 
be registered solely for exploration and production business.41 Presumably a company with 
51% Nigerian shareholding will qualify as ‘substantially Nigerian;’ in fact, the Nigerian 
Local Content Act in its Section 105 expressly refers to this 51% local requirement. The 
company should also reflect the following attributes: ‘background and experience with 
exploration and production at sufficiently high level’; ‘Niger Delta representation’; and the 
ubiquitous, ‘Federal Character representativeness’.42 
 
The process for the acquisition of marginal fields as outlined in the Guidelines is as follows: 
 
1. The marginal fields are publicly announced and eligible companies are invited to 
submit proposals to the DPR, in accordance with the requirements of the guidelines. 
2. The DPR selects up to five companies per marginal field. 
3. Pre-qualified companies are invited to submit field-specific technical and commercial 
bid. 
4. Successful bidders enter negotiations on a farm-out agreement with the OML 
holder(s).43  
 
                                       
37 See the Department’s web pages at: https://dpr.gov.ng/index/ accessed 19 May 2016. 
38 Tominiyi Owolabi, Wolemi Esan and Damilola Salawu, ‘Oil and gas regulation in Nigeria: Overview’ 
(Reuters, 1 May 2014) <http://uk.practicallaw.com/5-523-4794?q=*&qp=&qo=&qe=> accessed 8 September 
2014. 
39  See ‘Roles of DPR – Upstream’ (Department of Petroleum Resources) available at 
<http://dpr.gov.ng/index/dpr-operations/upstream-regulation/roles-of-dpr-upstream/> accessed  5 September 
2014 
40 Available at: https://dpr.gov.ng/index/marginal-field-map/ accessed 19 May 2016. 
41 See the GFOMF, Section 6.5 on ‘Criteria for Evaluation’ at para vii. 
42Ibid.   
43 Ibid. 
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The key features of a farm-out agreement are also specified in the guidelines. They include 
provision on the following:  
 
i. Straddled Fields and Reservoirs – a unitisation agreement should be signed for any 
straddled field as it is a condition precedent for approval of a farm-out.44 
ii. Abandonment – costs for decommissioning shall be shared equitably. An agreed 
percentage shall be set aside by the farmee in its budget.45 
iii. Community Development/Relationship – the farmee is responsible for community 
development activities.46 
iv. Non-performance – in the event of the farmee’s insolvency, the field shall revert back 
to the farmor less any liabilities of the farmee.47  
v. Encumbrance – the farmee may secure any required assistance but shall not reach an 
agreement with parties that encumber the lease or farm-out area.48 
vi. Assignment and Termination - prior consent of the Minister shall be obtained before 
any assignment or termination by the farmee.49 
3. Enhancing Indigenous Participation Under the Local Content Act 
A focused approach to enhancing indigenous participation in the Nigerian oil industry began 
with a workshop organised by the National Petroleum Investment Management (NAPIMS) in 
2001.50 The workshop produced a communique which recommended the creation of the 
National Committee on Local Content Development (NCLCD).51 In 2002 the Committee 
produced a report of their findings on Nigerian content in the oil and gas sector, the NCLCD 
Report. The NCLCD Report proposed targets for aggregate local content value in the oil and 
gas industry - 40 per cent in 2005 and 60 per cent in 2010 - and recommended the drafting of 
a Nigerian Content Development Bill.52 In the same year, a Nigerian content study was 
undertaken by the Nigerian Content Unit, a section of the Department of Petroleum 
Resources (DPR). The study was commissioned by the Norwegian Agency for Development 
Cooperation (NORAD) and the Norwegian Ministry for Petroleum and Energy (NPE) under 
the custody of the NNPC, DPR, NAPIMS and the Office of the Advisor to the President on 
Petroleum and Energy. This resulted in the afore-mentioned, “INTSOK Report.” The 
INTSOK Report stressed that the ultimate goal of a viable local content policy should be the 
creation of jobs as well as the enhancement of sustainable growth in industrial and national 
wealth.53 The Report also recommended that “oil companies should be asked to take – and 
accept – a major responsibility to achieve the objectives that are set”.54 A significant finding 
of the Report is that: 
 
                                       
44 See Section 13.0 ‘Elements of Farm-out agreements’ at para v. 
45 Ibid para iv. 
46 Ibid para ix. 
47 Ibid section 15.0. 
48 Ibid section 16.0. 
49 Ibid section 17.0. 
50 Toyin Falola and Jessica Achberger (eds), The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment in 
Africa (Taylor and Francis 2013) 57. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid.  
53 See the INTSOK Report (n 2), 63. 
54 Ibid, 64. 
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As for the local content policy regarding upstream oil and gas, two pillars have to 
be constructed. One is the responsibility of the oil companies; the other is the 
policy of the government. Government policy will have great bearing as to the 
commitments that the oil companies are willing to make. Government policy, and 
in particular policies influencing the framework conditions for investments and 
business development, also have great bearing on a third group of players that is 
required for industrial capacity expansion, namely the entrepreneurs who are 
willing to invest to provide the needed goods and services.55  
A further report was instrumental to the development of the Nigerian Content Policy - the 
‘Synchronised Report on Enhancement of Local Content in the Upstream Sector of the Oil 
and Gas Industry in Nigeria’ (“Synchronised Report”). The Synchronised Report recognised 
the need to balance encouragement of foreign investment with participation and development 
of indigenous capabilities, and recommended preferential treatment for indigenous companies 
and the categorisation of companies.56  
 
It is worth mentioning that in 2004, a Nigerian Content Division (NCD) was created within 
the NNPC to actively manage indigenous skills, develop capacities, and monitor compliance 
and growth in local content implementation. However, it can be argued that it was the three 
reports – the NCLCD Report, the INTSOK Report and the Synchronised Report which 
effectively provided the foundation for the Local Content Act 2010.  
 
The Local Content Act is divided into three parts. Part One deals mostly with developing 
Nigerian content in the oil and gas industry. Part Two provides for the establishment of the 
Nigerian Content Development and Monitoring Board (NCDMB) while Part Three deals with 
financial and legal matters. 57 The act aims to facilitate indigenous participation and to 
promote local content development in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. It applies to all 
Nigerian operators and operations carried out within the Nigerian oil and gas industry.58 It 
also administers local content requirements, which apply to all contracts entered into after its 
enactment.59 The objective of these provisions can be said to be to domicile relevant 
economic activities in the Nigerian oil and gas industry in Nigeria.60 
 
The Act defines ‘Nigerian content’ as,  
 
…the quantum of composite value added to or created in the Nigerian economy by a 
systematic development of capacity and capabilities through the deliberate utilization 
of Nigerian human, material resources and services in the Nigerian Petroleum 
Industry.61 
 
                                       
55 Ibid, 64. Emphasis in original. 
56  Hilary-Nwokonko (n 4), 4. 
57 The Act is divided into three parts. Part one deals mostly with developing Nigerian content in the oil and gas 
industry. Part two dwells on the establishment of the Nigerian Content Development and Monitoring Board 
(NCDMB) while part three provides for financial and legal matters. 
58 The Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act 2010, s 1. 
59 The Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act 2010, s 6. 
60 Olaniwun Ajayi, ‘Nigeria Oil and Gas’ (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, March 2013) 
<www.freshfields.com/uploadedFiles/SiteWide/News_Room/Insight/Africa_ENR/Nigeria/Nigeria%20oil%20a
nd%20gas.pdf> accessed 3 July 2014. 
61 This definition emphasises value addition to the Nigerian economy.  
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It presents several opportunities for the promotion of indigenous participation by prescribing 
as follows: 
 
1. First consideration to be given to Nigerian operators in the award of licenses or oil 
blocks and in all projects for contracts awarded in the Nigerian oil and gas 
industry.62  
2. Exclusive consideration to be given to Nigerian indigenous service companies 
which demonstrate ownership of equipment, Nigerian personnel and capacity to 
execute the work.63 Although this section of the Act encourages indigenous 
participation, the use of the word “exclusive” implies the exclusion of all non-
Nigerian service companies. In our opinion, this provision goes against the FG’s 
objective of attracting foreign investment. 
3. Promotion of Nigerian content development shall be a major criterion for the 
award of licenses, permits and any other bid interests.64 Likewise, it provides that 
the NCDMB or “the Board”, established under the Local Content Act, shall ensure 
a measurable and continuous growth of Nigerian content in all transactions in the 
Nigerian oil and gas industry.65  
4. First consideration to be given for Nigerian goods and services so as to develop 
the supply of local services and products.66 This must be specified by an operator 
in a Nigerian Content Plan submitted to the Board for approval.67 
5. First consideration to be given to Nigerians for employment and training in any 
project executed in the Nigerian oil and gas industry.68 The Act is intent on the 
development of indigenous skills. Section 29 provides for the submission of an 
Employment and Training (E and T) Plan by operators. The procedure for such 
training must be specified in the Plan. Furthermore, where Nigerians are not 
employed for lack of training, the operator must supply such training locally or 
elsewhere.69  
6. Use of indigenous assets in oil and gas operations by prohibiting the importation 
of welded products and requires that all fabrication and welding activities be 
carried out in Nigeria.70 This also encourages the ownership of indigenous assets 
by the local service contractors. 
7. Technology transfer in accordance with the country’s plans and priorities.71 
 
We identify certain limitations implicit in the above provisions below: 
First, the principle of the lowest bidder is not the definitive yardstick for award of contracts. 
Contracts can be awarded to an indigenous company that is not the lowest bidder but has the 
capacity to execute a project.72 However, the value of the contract must not be more than 10 
per cent of the lowest bid price. In our opinion, this provision does not guarantee effective 
competition among bidders. Although, the Act aims to provide full and fair opportunity for 
                                       
62 The Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act 2010, s 3(1). 
63 Ibid, s 3(2).  
64 Ibid, s.3(3). 
65 Ibid, s 5. 
66 Ibid, s 12. 
67 Ibid, s 7. 
68 Ibid, s 28(1).  
69 Ibid, s 30.  
70 Ibid, s 53.  
71 Ibid, s 43. This program must be to the satisfaction of the Board. 
72 Ibid, s 16.  
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Nigerian contractors,73 it ought not to discourage effective competition in relation to foreign 
suppliers. Nevertheless, foreign companies may participate in the process by either 
incorporating a Nigerian subsidiary or enter into JVA with one or more indigenous 
company.74 With respect to expatriate positions in an indigenous oil firm, an operator may 
retain a maximum of 5 per cent allowance for management positions for expatriates.75 This 
section is intended for the protection of the interest of investors. However, it may deter 
foreign investments as international stakeholders may not consider this an effective 
representation of their interests.  
 
Second, an operator is mandated to submit a Nigerian content plan for all projects,76 which is 
to ensure that first consideration is given to Nigerians for training and employment.77 The 
Act further states that the Board shall ensure that the operator maintains a reasonable amount 
of personnel in the areas it has significant operations.78 There is no indication of what 
constitutes a reasonable amount of personnel - what percentage of the total employees would 
be reasonable? Would this refer to the general employment or would exceptions be made 
where the operator claims a knowledge or skills shortage? It would have been preferable if 
these issues were clearly addressed in the Act’s interpretation section or subsequent 
guidelines and/or regulations. Additionally, the penalty for non-compliance with the 
provisions of the Act is a fine of 5 per cent of the project sum or a cancellation of the 
project.79 Even if the fine is adequate a point on which we have reservations, the procedure 
for enforcement of penalties is not clear.  
 
Third, the brief definition of a Nigerian company under the Act can also be a limitation since 
it does not absolutely preclude the formation or control of an indigenous company by rich 
foreign investors. The Act defined a Nigerian company to mean “a company formed and 
registered in Nigeria in accordance with the provision of Companies and Allied Matters Act 
with not less than 51 % equity shares by Nigerians.”80 In practice, it is possible that 
“indigenous” oil companies can be fronts for IOCs or other private foreign owners. The 
provisions of the Local Content Act ought to have been more detailed and exact in limiting 
the use of Nigerian registered companies as fronts for foreign ownership. A decisive example 
can be found in the laws of the UAE, another oil producing country. Article 22 of UAE 
Federal Law No 8 1984, which law makes provisions for commercial companies, states as 
follows:  
 
Without prejudice to commercial activities reserved only to nationals, as may be 
prescribed herein or in any other law, it is a requirement for the establishment of a 
company to have one or more national partner(s) whose share in the company's capital 
is not less than 51%. 
 
The above provision is reinforced by Article 2 of the UAE Federal Law No 17 2004 which 
makes it illegal to conceal foreign involvement in any commercial enterprise. This provision 
clearly states: 
                                       
73 Ibid, s 15. 
74 Chijioke Nwaozuzu, ‘Marginal fields licensing round 2013: Prospects, delays (1)’  
Vanguard (Lagos, June 10 2014). 
75 Ibid, s 32. 
76 Ibid, s 7.  
77 Ibid, s 10(1)(b).  
78 Ibid, s 28(2). 
79 Ibid, s 68.  
80 Ibid, s 109. 
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Concealment of any foreigner is prohibited– whether physical or juristic person – and 
whether it is carried out by using the name, the license, the commercial register of the 
concealer or by any other means in the light of the definition of concealment 
mentioned in Article 1 of the present Law.   
 
The above provision has further been interpreted as extending the anti-concealment 
provisions to ‘side agreements’ in joint venture contracts, that is, agreements where a national 
purports to hold a percentage of the indigenous company in trust for foreign-owners. Such 
side agreements have hitherto been reached in an attempt to circumvent the provisions of 
UAE Federal Law No 8 of 1984 which bars foreigners outside established UAE Free Zones, 
from owning more than forty-nine percent of a Joint Venture.81  If the intent of the Nigerian 
Local Content Act is to prohibit and forestall the use of local companies as fronts for foreign 
commercial companies, provisions such as these referred from the UAE above, are more 
likely to achieve the objective of preserving local content than what the Local Content Act 
currently provides. 
 
A fourth limitation is found in sections 43-47 of the Local Content Act on technology 
transfer. These are general exhortatory provisions requiring operators to show plans on how 
they proceed with respect to technology transfer to Nigeria. There are no definite schemes or 
obligations such as a requirement that a percentage of the R&D work undertaken must be 
carried out in Nigerian centres or universities or that patents and other IP developed in the 
course of projects in Nigeria should be first registered in the country.  
 
Fifth, the Act does not in its provisions or by reference to secondary provisions address the 
often cited shortage of skills and experience in the Nigerian labour market which has always 
been the reason for the minimal employment of Nigerians in the oil and gas industry. The 
sixth limitation is that there is no provision relating to funding the development of fields 
subsequent to the awards. While the scope of the Local Content Act is more broadly to 
address Nigeria’s content policy and not specifically for the marginal fields programme, in 
our view, field development involves huge investments and risks which cannot be borne 
solely by the indigenous companies. Most of the indigenous companies are only able to raise 
money to acquire the fields and require further funding for operations from local banks.82  
Without collateral by way of security, opportunities for funding from banks in Nigeria may 
not be readily available. Hence, the need to invite foreign partners becomes inevitable83 
Provisions that acknowledge or at least advise on the government’s intent to support the 
funding initiatives under the aforementioned DPR Guidelines for Farm-out and Operations of 
Marginal Fields would in our view lend more credibility to the government’s efforts to 
support local participation. 
 
Notwithstanding the above limitations, the 2010 Act established the NCDMB,84 tasked with 
monitoring, coordinating and implementing the provisions of the Act;85 and a Nigerian 
Content Development Fund (NCDF) where one per cent of the total contract sum awarded in 
                                       
81 See Nabil A Issa, “United Arab Emirates: Of Side Agreements and JVs’ The Oath, online at: 
http://www.theoath-me.com/s/united-arab-emirates-of-side-agreements-and-jvs accessed 19 May 2016. 
82 S 52(1) Local Content Act allows for only the services of indigenous or local banks to be retained. 
83 Ibid n 76. 
84 Ibid, s 69 
85 Ibid, s 4. It also established the Nigerian Content Consultative Forum to provide a platform for information 
sharing (see s 57)  
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the upstream sector is to be paid. Local participation in the petroleum sector is currently 
accelerating however most indigenous players encounter the same obstacles, namely – 
deficient infrastructural facilities, corruption and mismanagement, unsuitable materials, 
inadequate financing and volatile locations.86 These same problems have hindered the 
development of some previously awarded marginal fields. To a large extent, indigenous 
participation is still driven by foreign expertise, a situation which has been effectively 
addressed in countries such as Norway which can be a useful comparator for Nigeria’s local 
content objectives. 
 
Norway has successfully managed its oil industry adopting local content policy and initiatives 
since its first production exercise in 1971.87 According to a commentator,  
 
Norway’s successful management of its oil industry is largely due to the 
determination of the leaders who ensured that they utilized the existing competence in 
the country at the time, and to the private companies which were ready to develop 
expertise and become competitive in this new market both in Norway and abroad. 
And finally quite a bit of luck goes into the equation.88 
 
Lady Luck may have shone on Norway as the last sentence above suggests. However, a more 
tangible explanation is that the Norwegian government early on, supplemented its Act of 29 
November 1996 No. 72 relating to petroleum activities with local content policies. 
Government equity participation began in 1967 and in 1972 when the Goods and Services 
Office was created with the aim of monitoring indigenous companies awarded contracts.89 
Norway’s local content policy began in the same year with the creation of the national oil 
company Statoil, setting in motion a series of policies which mandated oil companies to use 
Norwegian goods and services.90 This led to the expansion of Norwegian operators and 
suppliers. Licenses are awarded through mixed rounds with the mix of partners decide by the 
Ministry of Oil and Energy.91 The IOCs trained Norwegian personnel in other parts of the 
world then brought them back home to indigenise the industry.92 
 
At first glance, the policy measures adopted by Norway are similar to those of Nigeria. Both 
countries established a National Oil Company (NOC) and introduced local content 
requirement, training of local staff and transfer of technology. However as pointed out earlier, 
there are marked differences with respect to policy design, transparency and enforcement of 
regulations,93 the sharing or transfer of technology and expertise to local companies, and the 
                                       
86 See Nwosu and ors (n10). 
87 See Thomas K Svenson and ors, ‘Oil and Gas Regulation in Norway: Overview’ (Practical law, 2014)  
http://uk.practicallaw.com/6-529-5206  accessed 19 May 2016; the INTSOK Report (n 2), 46.   
88 Hege Hertsberg, ‘Making Local Content Work – The Norwegian Experience' (Local Content Exhibition and 
Conference, Ghana, October 2013) at: http://www.ghana.norway.info/News_and_events/News-and-
Events/Ghana/Making-local-content-work---the-Norwegian-experience/#.Vz218U32YdU   accessed 19 May 
2016. 
89 Shirley Neff, ‘Memorandum on international Best Practice in Development of Local Content in the Energy 
Sector’ (Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, 4 May 2005) 
<www.neiti.org.ng/sites/default/files/page/uploads/local-content-5-9-051.pdf> accessed 19 May 2016 
90 Oystein Noreng, ‘The Norwegian Experience of Economic Diversification in Relation to Petroleum Industry’ 
(2004) Vol. 2 Issue 4 Oil, Gas & Energy Law Intelligence (OGEL).   
91 See INTSOK Report (n 2). 
92 Ibid. An example is Saga Petroleum, which is an independent private company established in 1971. The 
company began its operations abroad before establishing in Norway. 
93 Ibid.  
13 
 
promotion and support for research and development activity in the sector. 94 
4. The Marginal Oil Fields Programme (MFP) 
In Nigeria, marginal fields are fields initially allocated to IOCs, which have remained 
undeveloped because they are considered uneconomic in terms of their production and 
revenue potentials when compared to others.95 There are about 183 oil fields under 
concessions in Nigeria that have remained underdeveloped and abandoned. The fields are 
estimated to contain about 2.3 billion barrels of stock tank oil initially in place (STOIIP) 
valued at USD 50.6 billion.96 These fields have undergone little or no appraisal activities 
although exploration discoveries have been made.97  
 
The IOCs left some oil and gas resources unproduced many years after discovery for reasons 
including the OPEC production quota. These fields contain reserves, which when produced 
by the IOCs are uneconomic but could be profitable for local operators as a result of their low 
operating costs.98 In December 1999, about 116 of such fields were identified in Nigeria and 
they collectively contained presumed reserves of about 1.3 billion barrels.99  
 
The Petroleum (Amendment) Decree No.23 of 1996 provided the legal framework for the 
farmout and award of marginal fields100 and led to the Marginal Fields Policy (MFP) the 
objectives of which include: Promotion of indigenous participation; Generation of 
employment for Nigerian people; Increase of production capacity; Enhancement of oil and 
gas reserves and; Ensure a favourable return on investments. 101 
 
In 2003, a total of 24 marginal oil fields were awarded to 31 indigenous oil companies; 17 
fields were awarded to sole operators while the remaining 7 were awarded jointly to 14 
operators (See Appendix I). About 37 fields were on offer in the 2014 round of bids. (See 
Appendix II). Out of about 30 marginal fields awarded as at May 2016, only nine102 had 
                                       
94 See Noreng (n 90).  
95 Deloitte: ‘Marginal Fields: Roadmap to Growing the Nation’s Reserves’ Inside Tax, Iss 46 (2014) 
www.deloitte.com/view/en_NG/ng/insights/publications/inside-
tax/7f5a5d0dc7725410VgnVCM3000003456f70aRCRD.htm accessed 30 August 2014. See also Martin Olisa, 
Nigerian Petroleum Law and Practice (2nd edn, Jonia Ventures Limited 1997) 153 
96 Chijioke Emole, ‘The Petroleum (Amendment) Decree, 1996, of Nigeria’ (1997) Vol. 41 Issue 2 Journal of 
African Law, pp 239-245.  
97 Ownership of the fields were as follows: Shell – 115, Agip – 23, Chevron – 19, Mobil – 10, Elf – 8, Texaco – 
3, Ashland – 1 and Nigerian Petroleum Development Company (NPDC) – 4. 
98 See further, Atsegbua (n 5); Olisa (n 95).   
99 Oluropo Rufus Ayodele and Samuel Frimpong, 'Economics of Nigerian Marginal Fields' (SPE Hydrocarbon 
and Economics Evaluation Symposium, Dallas, April 2003) <www.onepetro.org/download/conference-
paper/SPE-81998-MS?id=conference-paper%2FSPE-81998-MS> accessed 19 May 2016. 
100 Petroleum (Amendment) Decree No.23 of 1996, paragraph 16A. This Act came after much controversy 
between IOCs and local firms to whom marginal fields had been re-allocated by government fiat. See Ayodele 
and Frimpong (n 99).  
101 See Atsegbua (n 5); Koso I Idigbe and Kelani O Bello, 'Sustainable Operation of Marginal Fields in Nigeria: 
Opportunities, Challenges and Best Practices' (2013) Vol. 4 Issue 4 Journal of Emerging Trends in Engineering 
and Applied Sciences pp 686-691. The decision of IOCs to concentrate on their deep-water operations and 
consequently divest their onshore assets has also facilitated the programme with 13 onshore assets put up for 
sale since 2010 – see Owolabi and ors (n 38). 
102These and their operators are: Umusadege (Midwestern Oil and Gas/Mart Resources/Suntrust Oil), Umusati 
(Pillar Oil), Ibigwe (Waltersmith/Morris Petroleum), Egboma (Asuokpu/Umutu (Platform Petroleum), 
Obodugwa/Obodeti (Energia Petroleum/Oando), Ajapa (Britania-U), Ogbelle (Niger Delta Petroleum 
Corporation), Ebole (Oriental Energy) and Uquo (Frontier Oil).  
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commenced production. 103 The Marginal Field Operators (MFO’s) current combined volume 
of 60,000bpd, is however still minimal- about 2 per cent of Nigeria’s daily production.104 
5. Marginal Fields, Local Content, and an Effective Regulatory Approach 
Voluntary divestments by IOCs will no doubt assist the object of encouraging more local 
participants into Nigeria’s oil and gas industry. The success of the regulatory approach under 
the MFP and the local content policy objectives to address the peculiar concerns for enhanced 
indigenous participation depend on a range of factors.  These challenges include funding 
concerns, limited technical competence and legal and policy effectiveness issues affecting the 
actual realisation of the objectives under both the MFP and the Local Content Policy.  
5.1 Funding Concerns and Limited Financial (Lending) Assistance 
In our view, the fundamental test of the success of the MFP is whether the policy achieves the 
optimization of oil production and of oil reserves. The DPR has commendably mandated all 
MFOs with non-producing marginal fields to develop them or risk losing their operating 
licenses.105 However given the huge capital requirement for oil exploration and production, 
there has been comparatively minimal success for the indigenous players in the upstream 
sector as not many have made progress with their farmed-out leases.106 This is where the 
banks play a significant role.107  
 
Banks are basically risk averse and lend at a fixed margin. However, before lending, they 
contemplate several risks such as: 
 
• The oil will not be found in commercial quantities.108 
• Expropriation, nationalisation of assets or change in legislation will bring the 
company’s operations to an end.109 
                                       
103 See Department of Petroleum Resources Nigeria at https://dpr.gov.ng/index/list-of-marginal-fields/ . See also 
George Osahon, “Marginal Field Development: Best Practices & Lessions Learned’ (Society of Petroleum 
Engineers’ 37th Nigerian Annual International Conference & Exhibition, Lagos, July 2013) 
<www.spenigeriacouncil.org/images/13NAICE_PRESENTATIONS/MFW/DPRMARGINAL%20FIELD%20D
EVELOPMENT_MFW.pdf> accessed 27 August 2014  
The Directorate of Petroleum Resources (DPR) instructed all holders of marginal field, both foreign and local, 
to develop the fields or risk the loss of their operating licenses. See also, Raj Kulasingam and ors, ‘Nigeria's 
Marginal Fields Process, Opportunities, Challenges and Stetson Hats!’ (Nigeria Development and Finance 
Forum, 18 April 2014) 
www.nigeriadevelopmentandfinanceforum.org/PolicyDialogue/Dialogue.aspx?Edition=219# accessed 19 May 
2016. 
104 See George Osahon, (n 103). The FG announced the Second Marginal Field Bid Round in November 2013. 
There are 31 fields on offer with 16 located onshore and 15 on the continental shelf, see See DPR Guidelines. 
See further NNPC: ‘FG Kicks off Second Marginal Fields Bid Round - Assures of Transparency and 
Accountability in Bid Process’ (Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation) 
www.nnpcgroup.com/PublicRelations/NNPCinthenews/tabid/92/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/479/FG-
Kicks-off-Second-Marginal-Fields-Bid-Round-Assures-of-Transparency-and-Accountability-in-Bid-
Process.aspx accessed 19 May 2016.  
105 See Kulasingam and ors, (n 103). 
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid. 
108  See Taverne, (n 32) 80 
109 In the Nigerian context, this is not an issue as s.44 of the 1999 Constitution, s.25 (1) Nigerian Investment 
Promotion Commission Act (NIPC) and some of the bilateral investment treaties entered into by Nigeria also 
provide similar guarantees against expropriation of assets. 
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• Project is beyond budget or ill-timed and may not perform as expected.110  
• Company activities may present environment risks leading to its liquidation.111  
 
Notably, out of six producing marginal fields, operated by indigenous oil companies, only 
Brittania-U was originally funded by a bank.112 Other players had to adopt varied means of 
obtaining funding: Platform Petroleum’s funds were provided by its partners (New Cross); 
Pillar Oil through shareholder’s contributions; WalterSmith Oil Ltd could not raise funds 
from a bank until it had established production while Energia Oil Ltd relied on cash flow 
from its shareholders.113 The traditional banking model in Nigeria prefers lending against 
collaterals and securities. Most banks maintain that the main problem with funding marginal 
field development is that the collateral is the marginal field itself.114 The banks are also more 
disposed to provide loans where a MFO has a substantial deposit with the bank, cash flow 
from other oilfield operations or businesses; then the bank can leverage on these to approve 
loan facilities.115 There is also a question on the risk-bearing ability of the local banks whose 
individual capital base (without forming consortia) may not be sufficient to offer financial 
assistance under the MFP and still continue the day to day retail and other investment 
banking activities.  
 
A pertinent issue arises with regards to offering the marginal field as collateral. A marginal 
field is  a potential income earner and ought to be, at least presumably,  a favourable 
collateral. Although the Guidelines provide that an awardee may enter into any arrangements 
necessary to enable it perform its obligations, awardees are however as mentioned earlier, 
prohibited from encumbering the field in any way. This implies that an awardee may enter 
into pertinent technical and financial service agreements with regard to the financing and 
operation of the marginal field, but may not use the marginal field as security in a financial 
arrangement i.e. the marginal field cannot be used as collateral for a loan. Also important, is 
the fact that the guidelines further provide that any assignment of interest in a marginal field 
shall require the prior consent of the Minister. This is in accordance with Para. 14 – 16 of the 
First Schedule to the Petroleum Act. It essentially requires the Minister’s prior consent to the 
assignment of any right, power or interest in a licence or lease. Creating such a collateral or 
lien over and in the Marginal Field (a farmed-out portion of an OML) could therefore require 
such a prior consent of the Minister as provided in the Guidelines.  
 
Local banks therefore have to adopt a ‘reserves-based lending’ approach, accepting the ‘oil in 
the ground’ as collateral for lending, for the development of a marginal field.116 This is of 
course a risk for the bank particularly if one considers not only the technical know-how 
required for indigenous producers which may not be immediately for quick profit yielding 
exploration and production activities but also that some the marginal fields may well be 
unprofitable.117 For the latter sub-economic fields, it could be that there is more work for the 
Nigerian government to do in terms of for instance, either ensuring the viability of Marginal 
fields offered in bid rounds, or guaranteeing the loan request by providing another two or 
                                       
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid. 
112 See Chijioke Nwaozuzu, ‘Marginal Fields Licensing Round 2013: Prospects, Delays(1)’ Vanguard 
Newspapers Nigeria, 10 June 2014 <www.vanguardngr.com/2014/06/marginal-fields-licensing-round-2013-
prospects-delays-1/> accessed 02 Nov 2016. 
113 Ibid.  
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid.  
117 Ibid.  
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more fields with very low reserves, as further security. This would ensure that the fields put 
together may therefore produce enough oil to service the loans in due course. Alternatively, 
the FG could provide a direct guarantee to local banks thereby encouraging the latter to 
provide finances under the MFP, and also monitor the activities by the indigenous players to 
ensure the field is actually being optimised, or the licence is revoked.  
 
Given the challenges of obtaining assistance from local banks, indigenous companies have 
mainly opted for financing marginal fields through foreign investments.118 This portends a 
situation where indigenous companies act as proxy or fronts for foreign companies who do 
not have the 51% requirement under the CAMA, thereby defeating the local content 
objective.  
5.2 Technical competence, R&D 
The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14th December 1962 
guarantees a State permanent sovereignty over its natural resources. However, without local 
technical competence and intellectual property rights over technical processes in oil 
exploration and production, it could be a challenge for both the State and for indigenous oil 
producers to have effective control and ownership of petroleum resources. In most 
circumstances, projects that create opportunities for local participation are driven by foreign 
technical capabilities.119 It has been argued by some industry stakeholders that over 70 per 
cent of contracts awarded to indigenous contractors are executed overseas.120 Apart from 
establishing the continued dependence on foreign companies for extracting and processing 
the oil resources, this defeats the principal objective of local content which is for local 
participation by citizens in the economic activity and profits of oil exploration. It also 
demands huge foreign expenditure, results in capital flight out of the country, with significant 
loss of revenue accruing from oil exploration.121 The State, in this instance, Nigeria does not 
therefore benefit from capital re-investment in the economy. 
In order to ensure sustainability and adequate reward for investors there is need for operators 
to develop the technical and managerial know-how for enhancing and sustaining the 
industry.122 In the absence of local abilities and suppliers, foreign equipment and skills are 
brought in. The result is huge operational costs and unprofitable projects. Some marginal 
field owners have found it difficult to engage competent personnel or to manage the start-up 
risks in the business.123 It is essential that indigenous operators have to work with IOC’s for 
an effective transfer of skills; this could indeed form part of the contractual agreement under 
a marginal field divestment process and there is a proven benefit when organisations work 
together.124 For instance, in the Norwegian model, IOC’s were in joint teams with the local 
companies which made it easier for the local companies to learn the business and adapt to the 
                                       
118 Ibid  
119 Bede Nwete, ‘Legal and Policy Framework for Promoting Petroleum Expertise in Africa’ (2006) Vol. 4 Issue 
3 Oil, Gas & Energy Law Intelligence (OGEL) 
120 Jean Balouga, ‘Nigerian Local Content: Challenges and Prospects’ (2012) International Association for 
Energy Economics p24 <www.iaee.org/en/publications/newsletterdl.aspx?id=176> accessed 02 November 
2016. 
121 For instance in 2006, it was estimated that Nigeria experiences capital loss of about $4.5 billion annually.  
122 Ibid.  
123 See generally, Nwete (n 119). 
124 See further, O O Jegede, and ors, ‘Knowledge Sharing and Innovation as it Affects the Local Content in the 
Oil and Gas Industry in Nigeria’ (2013) Vol. 5 Issue 1 African Journal of Science, Technology, Innovation and 
Development pp 31-38. 
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challenges. 125 This could form part of the MFP programme as an agenda driven by the 
government agency to facilitate effective transfer of business and technical know-how.  
5.3 Legal and Policy Limitations  
The technological edge required in the industry is driven by well-articulated policies, legal 
and fiscal frameworks.126 The regulatory requirements for the assignment of a licence or 
lease, or any right or interest in such licence or lease, have been a recurring issue in the 
acquisition of upstream petroleum assets in Nigeria. There are certain shortcomings of the 
overall Nigerian Content Policy framework which may also limit the desired impact of the 
MFP and the local content policy. For instance, a reporting procedure and format to 
demonstrate compliance with the local content requirement under the MFP is not provided 
under the framework. A provision similar to the ANP Regulation No. 9/2007 and Resolution 
No. 39/2007 under the Brazilian local content policy of Brazil would add credibility and 
support the objective of increasing local participation127 
There are other practical methods for improving local participation which can be emphasised 
in the supply and production chain in a manner similar to the Norwegian local content 
model.128  Encouraging present operators and the new players under the MFP to use the 
services of Nigerian suppliers, researchers, developers, can also address the skills shortage 
currently in the sector. As it is, the present policy concentrates on the ownership of assets by 
Nigerians and retaining oil and gas activities in the country.129 While this may mean wealth 
distribution for those few able to be part of the high capital investment oil business, it does 
not guarantee wealth redistribution in terms of income and engagement of services and 
talents of the wider society.   In addition, the provisions of Decree No.23130 have almost 
draconian features with the government able to as it appears, forcibly acquire assets of IOCs 
without offering compensation unlike the more flexible policies found in Norway.131 If the 
IOCs are to be persuaded to share their business and technical knowledge with indigenous 
entrants into the sector under the MFP programme, some flexibility including compensation 
where relevant, would facilitate their willingness to share such knowledge.  
 
Under the Guidelines, the exact nature of rights granted to a farmee is ambiguous. Under 
section 12.0(i), it is stated that “the farmor will earn an Over-riding Royalty interest.” 
                                       
125 Odd Instefjord, ‘Reflection on the Norwegian Experience Within the Oil and Gas Sector’ (Grata Law Firm 
Seminar, Almaty, 23 April 2010) 9 
<www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=4&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CDYQFjAD&u
rl=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.gratanet.com%2Fup_files%2Fthe_development_of_the_local_content_norwegian_e
xperience.ppt&ei=fTEYVPyANtGI7AbGk4CoBw&usg=AFQjCNHZpcXQCNfR4So_ukkCr5Nuvlf_6Q&bvm=
bv.75097201,d.ZWU> accessed 20 May 2016.  
126 See Nwete (n 119). 
127 Aluisio de Lima-Campos, ‘Local Content Requirements in the Oil and Gas Sector’ (World Bank Conference 
on Local Content Polices in the Oil, Gas and Mining sector, Vienna, September 2013) 8 
<www.worldbank.org/en/events/2013/10/01/local-content-policies-in-oil-gas-mining-sector#4>  accessed 20 
May 2016. 
128 Ibid 6. 
129 Ibid 3  
130 In 2004, the Petroleum Act and was amended and Decree No 23 is now entrenched in the first schedule of the 
Petroleum Act 2004.  
131 Farouk Al-Kasim, ‘The Relevance of the Norwegian Model to Developing Countries’ (Norad Seminar, 
Norway, 26 January 2006) 17 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTNTFPSI/Resources/606764-1150299531473/FaroukAl-Kasim.pdf> 
accessed 2 November 2016.  
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Without further explanation on what this implies, it could be read to mean that the farmor 
retains ownership in the field. However, under section 19.0, the same guidelines also state 
that once the farm-out agreement is entered into, the farmee “shall have all the rights of an 
OML holder” and that “all the rights and duties of the previous leaseholder shall be 
transferred to the leaseholder”.132 There is need for clarity on the legal status of the respective 
parties in a farm out and to define exactly what is meant by the ‘royalty interest’ retained by 
the farmor. 
 
We have earlier examined the limitations of the nature of the indigenous company under the 
Guidelines. Although the Guidelines’ provisions are supposed to be an incentive to develop 
local content participation, if the financial, technical and management challenges to the 
indigenous players are not met, the indigenous player will still be unable to effectively 
develop the marginal field. In light of these, it is therefore incumbent on the government to 
ensure that there are incentivising and support mechanisms for indigenous players to enable 
them maximise their entry into exploration activities. 
 
Finally, there is still need for clear incentives on research and development (R&D) and a 
strategy to guarantee that there are R&D provisions under the MFP programme which 
incorporate talent from local research institutes and universities. There is also no provision 
for the new players (and their partners) to engage in ancillary research activities to boost this 
sector in the country, develop future talent, and establish a skills-base in the industry in 
further development of the potential under the MFP. The Brazilian model provides for 
compulsory investment in R&D and provides incentives to promote R&D and innovation.133 
A similar model would be of further advantage to the enhancement of local content 
participation in Nigeria.  
6. Conclusion 
It has to be admitted that domestic regulations addressing obvious issues of low local content 
participation in the energy sector are better late than never. To satisfy the broader challenging 
context of indigenous participation in the oil and gas industry, infrastructure that addresses 
specific domestic challenges and broader concerns, rather than create generic provisions, are 
even better. The development of marginal fields is neither risk-free, nor is its success, 
guaranteed.134 Therefore, in the specific context of maximising the capacity for marginal field 
production, developing local content, and creating jobs and opportunities, availability of 
financial support, a focused approach to regulating minimum local content requirements by 
the responsible government agencies, and support for business and technical skills 
development for indigenous operators are also critical considerations for the Nigerian 
government in its advances towards achieving upstream oil sector liberalisation. 
                                       
132 Section 19.0 (i). 
133 Marcelo Mafra Borges de Macedo, ‘Brazilian Local Content Regulation Framework in the Oil & Gas 
Activities’ (World Bank Conference on Local Content Polices in the Oil, Gas and Mining sector, Vienna, 
September 2013) 3-4 <www.worldbank.org/en/events/2013/10/01/local-content-policies-in-oil-gas-mining-
sector#4>  accessed 8 September 2014 
134 See Kareem Mamdouh, “Marginal Oil Fields: Profitable Oil at Low Reserves: How?  
http://www.slideshare.net/karim3691/marginal-oil-fields-final accessed 19 May 2016. 
19 
 
APPENDIX I 
 
Previously Awarded Marginal Fields and Operators 2003 
 
Source: Department of Petroleum Resources, Concessions and Leases 
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APPENDIX II 
 
List of Ranked Marginal Fields for 2014 Bid Round 
 
 Source: Marginal Fields Bid Round Summary (Veren Energy) 
 
